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INTRODUCTION
On a particularly successful day at the Brooklyn Treatment Court,
several rounds of applause congratulated multiple participants who
“graduated” to different stages of the drug treatment program. The
presiding judge interacted directly with the defendants, knew personal
facts about them, and seemed to genuinely care about their responses to
her inquiries. 1 This drug treatment court is one example of a problemsolving court, a judicial approach that attempts to allow judges and
court staff to better respond to the needs of non-violent drug offenders
by addressing the underlying issues that bring people into the court
system in the first place. 2 This is achieved through innovative court
models that provide treatment and intensive judicial monitoring in an
attempt to respond to an offender’s problems including drug abuse,
mental illness, and domestic violence. 3
During the 1980s, there was an overload of drug-related cases
reaching criminal court due to a national increase in arrests that

1 I experienced this glimpse into a drug treatment court while conducting research for the
Office of Policy and Planning, a division in charge of running New York State problem-solving
courts.
2 Problem Solving Courts Overview, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS., https://www.nycourts.gov/
courts/problem_solving (last updated Feb. 16, 2017). Specifically, this Note will focus on
Criminal Drug Courts for defendants facing a felony or misdemeanor charge where drug
addiction is relevant to their crime. Drug Treatment Courts, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS.,
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/problem_solving/drugcourts/overview.shtml (last updated Jan.
5, 2016). In New York State, there are two additional types of drug courts: Family Drug
Treatment Courts and Juvenile Drug Treatment Courts, which respectively focus on neglect
petitions and juvenile delinquency, each involving substance abuse as a component of the
allegations. Id.
3 Drug Treatment Courts, supra note 2; see also What Are Problem-Solving Courts?,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=qa&iid=664 (last visited
Nov. 14, 2015).
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coincided with the greater availability of cocaine. 4 In response to this
national increase in drug offender incarceration, 5 the first drug court
opened its doors in Miami-Dade County, Florida, in 1989. 6 This pioneer
court sought to effect lasting change on nonviolent drug offenders
through a judicially supervised treatment program. 7 Rather than
continuing to put the same offenders on probation or in jail, this drug
court sought to decrease recidivism by tackling the causes of the
offenders’ drug problems head-on. 8 This was achieved by integrating
alcohol and drug treatment services into the judicial arena in order to
provide offenders with the rehabilitation necessary to end recidivism. 9
In addition, drug courts effectively transform the traditional adversarial
roles of the prosecutor and defense attorney into non-adversarial roles,
with an emphasis on teamwork and deference to the judge. 10 The drug
court design incorporates a graduated system of rewards and sanctions
based on how well the participants follow the rules of the court. 11 This
innovative approach is designed to hold offenders accountable for their
actions, while at the same time making them feel supported by the court
staff who affords them the tools they need to successfully combat the
drug abuse in their lives. 12 The potential sparked by the Miami-Dade
County drug court model is evidenced by the vast nationwide expansion
of drug courts since 1989. 13 As of June 2015, there are 1,558 adult drug
4 John S. Goldkamp, The Origin of the Treatment Drug Court in Miami, in THE EARLY
DRUG COURTS: CASE STUDIES IN JUDICIAL INNOVATION 19, 20 (W. Clinton Terry, III ed., 1999);
see also DRUG STRATEGIES, CUTTING CRIME: DRUG COURTS IN ACTION 6 (1997) (“With the
crack cocaine epidemic of the 1980s, the number of arrests for drug offenses rose from 647,411 in
1985 to more than 1 million in 1989.”).
5 JUSTICE POLICY INST., ADDICTED TO COURTS: HOW A GROWING DEPENDENCE ON DRUG
COURTS IMPACTS PEOPLE AND COMMUNITIES 4 (2011) [hereinafter ADDICTED TO COURTS]
(“Drug courts were created at the height of this increase in drug incarceration to give states an
option for working with people with drug addiction or who commit drug offenses.”).
6 History: Justice Professionals Pursue a Vision, NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG CT. PROFS.,
http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/drug-court-history (last visited Sept. 12, 2015).
7 Id.; see also Goldkamp, supra note 4, at 24 (“[I]t is the courtroom-based team approach to
treatment—and particularly the central, hands-on judicial role—that has distinguished Dade
County’s approach from other previous court initiatives aiming at the drug-related caseload.”).
8 DRUG STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 6.
9 Id. at 7.
10 See Goldkamp, supra note 4, at 25 (“The unusual role of the judge, however, is best
understood in the context of the unorthodox, nonadversarial, and team-oriented roles played by
the other criminal justice officials in the courtroom, roles designed to support the judge’s role and
to contribute to the treatment progress of the drug-involved felony defendants coming through the
court. . . . Most noticeable are the transformed roles of the prosecutor and defender.”).
11 ADDICTED TO COURTS, supra note 5, at 3.
12 JUDGE KAREN FREEMAN-WILSON & C. WEST HUDDLESTON, NAT’L DRUG COURT INST.,
DWI/DRUG COURTS: DEFINING A NATIONAL STRATEGY 5 (1999).
13 See, e.g., AMANDA B. CISSNER & MICHAEL REMPEL, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE
STATE OF DRUG COURT RESEARCH: MOVING BEYOND ‘DO THEY WORK?’ 1 (2005) (“[O]ver
1,300 drug courts in early 2005, less than 15 years after the Miami program enrolled its first
defendant.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, DRUG COURTS 1 (2017)
(“There are more than 3,100 drug courts across the United States, half of which are adult
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courts in the United States 14 and all fifty states have at least one drug
court. 15
With the rapid and continuous expansion of drug courts in the
United States, an in-depth analysis of the impact of these courts on the
constitutional rights of participants 16 is crucial. 17 In particular, the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel within a drug court proceeding is an area
that lacks clear guidance as to what is constitutionally required. In a
traditional criminal case, a defendant’s right to counsel attaches once
the adversarial proceeding against her has commenced. 18 In contrast, the
drug court proceeding is designed to be non-adversarial and there are
several stages that are distinguishable from a traditional criminal court
process. 19 Consequently, exactly when the right to counsel attaches
within a drug court proceeding is not easy to articulate nor clear from
the caselaw. If counsel is not present or required at all stages of a drug
court proceeding, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel
may be violated. 20
Drug courts implicate two aspects of the right to counsel: when it
applies and how it applies. This Note will propose that the right to
counsel is constitutionally mandatory during all stages of a drug court
proceeding, due to the potentially cumulative liberty interests at stake
throughout each drug court participant’s case. Considering the nonadversarial approach employed by drug courts, a defense attorney is left
without a clear sense of her role in the proceeding, diminishing her
ability to effectively advocate for the defendant. The effective assistance
of counsel is equally as important as when the right to counsel applies.
Therefore, the non-adversarial nature of a drug court proceeding must
not completely erode a defense attorney’s professional and ethical
obligation to zealously and effectively advocate for the interests of her

treatment courts.”).
14 Drug Courts, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., http://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/drug-courts/pages/
welcome.aspx (last modified Jan. 10, 2017).
15 Find a Drug Court, NAT’L DRUG CT. RESOURCE CTR., http://ndcrc.org/map (last updated
Dec. 31, 2015).
16 The term “participant,” used throughout this Note, refers to a defendant that is diverted
from traditional criminal court into a drug treatment court.
17 See Trent Oram & Kara Gleckler, Comment, An Analysis of the Constitutional Issues
Implicated in Drug Courts, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 471 (2006) (suggesting drug court improvement by
better safeguarding the constitutional rights of drug court participants, particularly due process
rights when entering and being terminated from drug courts, equal protection in accessing the
courts, and privacy while participating).
18 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
19 See RYAN S. KING & JILL PASQUARELLA, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DRUG COURTS: A
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 3–5 (2009) (discussing sanctions); JUDGE KAREN FREEMAN-WILSON
ET AL., NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS IN
DRUG COURT 1-3 (2001) [hereinafter ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS] (discussing staffings).
20 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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client. 21
This Note will proceed in three parts. Part I will explain the drug
court model by detailing the key components of drug courts in general
and by providing an outline of the three predominant drug court
models. 22 Additionally, this Part will provide an overview of the right to
counsel in traditional criminal proceedings, including probation
revocation hearings. Part II will contemplate why the non-traditional
stages of a drug court proceeding may constitutionally require counsel
and why the defense attorney’s role within the context of drug court is
problematic. Using the standards that govern traditional criminal
proceedings, Part III will argue that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel should attach during all stages of the proceeding including
staffings, status hearings, and hearings regarding termination from drug
court. 23 Additionally, this Part proposes that the Sixth Amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel through zealous and effective
advocacy is also constitutionally required during all drug court
proceedings. 24
I. THE DRUG TREATMENT COURT
In order to understand and appreciate the constitutional issues at
stake, it is crucial to first understand the aspects of a drug court
proceeding that differentiate it from a traditional criminal court
proceeding. This Part will first detail the drug court model generally,
then discuss the distinctions between the specific drug court models that
predominate. It will then provide an overview of the federal standards
regarding the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in traditional criminal
court proceedings. Since many stages of drug court are nontraditional, 25 as compared to criminal court, this Note will use the
critical stage doctrine 26 and probation revocation law 27 as analogous
contexts in which to analyze the stages of a drug court proceeding.

21
22

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7; r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
The three models are as follows: (1) pre-plea or deferred prosecution; (2) post-plea; (3)
post-sentencing (participation in drug court as a condition of probation). This section will discuss
the differences between each, though will primarily identify and focus on the right to counsel
issues in post-plea and post-sentencing models.
23 Each of these non-traditional drug court stages are discussed infra Part I.A.
24 See discussion infra Section I.B.4.
25 See discussion infra Section I.A (discussing the drug court model generally).
26 Referring to Supreme Court cases that carve out what right to counsel means and when it
attaches in the traditional criminal court context. See, e.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S.
191 (2008); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
27 See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972).
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The Drug Court Model Explained

The mission of drugs courts 28 is to end alcohol and drug abuse that
leads to criminal activity by integrating alcohol and drug treatment
services into the justice system. 29 This is accomplished through a nonadversarial approach that facilitates a less punitive, more rehabilitative
process. 30 The drug court team must work together to provide a
“therapeutic experience,” meaning the court staff is in frequent
communication about a participant’s progress to ensure that their
responses 31 to the defendant’s behavior are coordinated. 32 The team
consists of more than just lawyers, as it includes treatment providers
and case managers who are assigned to monitor compliance and remain
in communication with the judge. 33 Frequent alcohol and drug testing
occurs regularly to monitor compliance. 34 There is a coordinated
28 The National Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP) promulgated a
publication in 1997 titled Defining Drug Courts: The Key Components, which was intended to
identify and promote the best practices, designs, and operations of adult drug courts. THE NAT’L
ASS’N OF DRUG COURT PROF’LS, DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS (1997)
[hereinafter KEY COMPONENTS]. It serves as an ideal starting point for discussing the drug court
model and how it functions. While drug courts may, and certainly do, vary in different
jurisdictions, the practices described in this publication are intended to provide a flexible
framework. Id. at 3.
29 Id. at 9. Key Component #1: “Drug courts integrate alcohol and other drug treatment
services with justice system case processing.” Id. The criminal justice system is a particularly
effective vehicle to compel people who might not initially volunteer to participate in the treatment
program. The treatment process usually contains multiple phases that a participant gradually
works through including stabilization, intensive treatment, and transition. Id. Additionally, Key
Component #3 suggests that eligible participants be identified early and promptly placed into the
program. The period of time following an arrest is a “critical window of opportunity for
intervening and introducing” alcohol and drug treatment. Id. at 13.
30 See id. at 11. Key Component #2: “Using a nonadversarial approach, prosecution and
defense counsel promote public safety while protecting participants’ due process rights.” Id. The
purpose of the non-adversarial approach is to facilitate an individual’s progress in the program by
working together as a team. “[T]he prosecutor and defense counsel must shed their traditional
adversarial courtroom relationship and work together as a team. . . . Both the prosecuting attorney
and the defense counsel play important roles in the court’s coordinated strategy for responding to
noncompliance.” Id. at 11. Key Component #4: “Drug courts provide access to a continuum of
alcohol, drug, and other related treatment and rehabilitation services.” Id. at 15.
31 In other words, the drug court staff must be in frequent communication in order to remain
on the same page about the defendant’s treatment. For example, if the defendant comes into court
and tests positive for drugs, the judge, attorneys, and treatment staff need to be on the same page
regarding how this deviant behavior will be dealt with (i.e. through a sanction).
32 Id. at 15.
33 Id. at 15 (“In a drug court, the treatment experience begins in the courtroom and continues
through the participant’s drug court involvement. In other words, drug court is a comprehensive
therapeutic experience, only part of which takes place in a designated treatment setting. The
treatment and criminal justice professionals are members of the therapeutic team.”).
34 Id. at 21. The purpose of Key Component #5 is to use “[a]n accurate testing program . . . to
establish a framework for accountability and to gauge each participant’s progress.” Id. The
standards for alcohol and drug testing in the drug treatment court should be based on established
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strategy between the judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney in terms of
rewarding compliance or responding to noncompliance. 35 Additionally,
there are generally graduated responses of rewards and sanctions
ranging from praise in open court for progress to incarceration for
continued noncompliance. 36
The coordinated strategy between drug court professionals is most
frequently established at a meeting, called a “staffing,” that takes place
before participants’ status hearings. 37 Participants themselves do not
attend these meetings, despite the fact that this is when their course of
treatment and progress, or lack thereof, is heavily discussed among the
judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, and drug treatment staff. 38 The
issues that are raised and discussed during the staffing are generally not
shared in open court or put on the record. 39 Before the in-court status
hearing—where the participant is present— 40 the defense attorney is
expected to report back to her client, explaining the arguments that were
made on her client’s behalf during the staffing. 41
Another distinct characteristic of drug courts—as compared to
traditional criminal courts—is the extensive interaction between the

and tested guidelines, such as those established by the American Probation and Parole
Association. Drug testing results should ideally be available to the court the day of in order to
facilitate a swift court process and respond immediately to noncompliance. Id. at 21–22.
35 Id. at 23. Key Component #6: “A coordinated strategy governs drug court responses to
participants’ compliance.” Id.
36 Id. at 23–24 (“Drug courts must reward cooperation as well as respond to noncompliance.
Small rewards for incremental successes have an important effect on a participant’s sense of
purpose and accomplishment. Praise from the drug court judge for regular attendance or for a
period of clean drug tests, encouragement from the treatment staff or the judge at particularly
difficult times, and ceremonies in which tokens of accomplishment are awarded in open court for
completing a particular phase of treatment are all small but very important rewards that bolster
confidence and give inspiration to continue.”). Sanctions may include warnings in open court,
demotion to earlier program phases, increased frequency of court appearances, confinement to
jury box to witness court, fines, community service, escalating periods of jail confinement, and
termination. Id. at 24–25.
37 CYNTHIA HUJAR ORR ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, AMERICA’S
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: THE CRIMINAL COSTS OF TREATMENT AND THE CASE FOR
REFORM 31 (2009) (“Before the participants appear in court to meet with the judge, however, the
‘team’ meets behind closed doors in a ‘staffing’ to discuss the progress of the participants. This
meeting may be ‘the most animated, knock-down, drag-out fight,’ but participants are not part of
this crucial discussion about their lives, which is not on the record.”) (citation omitted).
38 See id. at 30.
39 See id. at 31.
40 The regular status hearings are a way in which drug courts are distinct from the traditional
criminal court proceeding. Lawyers are not frequently present during these status hearings, and
the courtroom interaction is mainly between the defendant and the judge directly. See James L.
Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the Meaning of Justice, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1543 (2003).
41 However, this rarely happens and is a cause for major concern of the zealous advocacy of
the defendant during a drug court proceeding. See infra Section II.B. (discussing the defense
attorney’s role as counsel).
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judge and the defendant. 42 Judicial intervention is the touchstone of a
drug court proceeding, as the judge is required to step beyond her
traditional role of independent and objective arbiter. 43 This presents the
potential concern that, given the interaction and relationship between
the judge and a drug court participant, the judge might let factors
outside the merits of an individual’s case, such as personal bias,
influence her judgment. 44 For example, due to the increased interaction
between the judge and the drug court participant, the judge may
unconsciously identify with a particular defendant, which may lead to
disparate treatment. 45 The National Drug Court Institute recommends
that judges be trained to recognize and address their potential bias, as
this interaction is necessary for the proper function and effectiveness of
a drug court. 46
A typical drug court program runs between six months and one
year, though some participants may remain in the program longer. 47 In
order to be eligible to participate in drug court, defendants generally
must be charged with drug possession or a non-violent offense where
they test positive for drugs and establish a substance abuse problem at
the time of arrest. 48 Drug court eligibility is determined by a review of
42 KEY COMPONENTS, supra note 28, at 27 (Key Component #7). The supervisory position of
the judge is incredibly important to the process since it demonstrates that someone in authority
actually cares about this defendant and the struggles they are facing. Id.
43 Id. (“A drug court judge must be prepared to encourage appropriate behavior and to
discourage and penalize inappropriate behavior. A drug court judge is knowledgeable about
treatment methods and their limitations.”). The remaining Key Components not yet referenced all
concern best practice recommendations for effectively running a successful drug treatment court.
Key Component #8 suggests developing and monitoring program goals in order to gauge
effectiveness. This is accomplished by clearly defining the design and operation of the drug court,
as well as remaining flexible for modifications if needed. Id. at 29. Key Component #9
emphasizes the importance of continually educating and training the entire drug court team in
order to ensure understanding of the standards and procedures across the board. Given the
teamwork approach to drug treatment courts, judges and court personnel should become familiar
with the treatment approaches, and treatment providers should likewise have a knowledge of the
criminal justice system. Id. at 35. Finally, Key Component #10 encourages the formation of
partnerships with community organizations and agencies in order to generate local support. Id. at
37.
44 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 19, at 9 (“Due to the continuing personal
engagement between participants and the drug court judge, the judge runs the risk of being
influenced by factors other than the merits of each participant’s case. Participants with friendly
dispositions or particularly compelling experiences may attract the judge’s compassion and
leniency, while those with less friendly personalities may provoke the opposite response.”).
45 Id. (“[A] judge’s identification with a participant (which may be unconscious) may lead to
disparate treatment, including excessively harsh treatment . . . .”).
46 Id.
47 KING & PASQUARELLA, supra note 19, at 4.
48 Id. at 3–4 (“[T]he definition of a violent offense can include the mere possession of a
weapon at the time of arrest, even if it was not presented, brandished, or used. Also, persons who
are currently facing charges for a drug offense may be denied entry into the drug court because of
a past, wholly unrelated offense.”); see also KEY COMPONENTS, supra note 28, at 13 (noting that
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the defendant’s criminal records, as well as a clinical screening to
determine severity of the substance abuse problem and whether these
problems can be meaningfully addressed through the drug court
process. 49 It is important to note that participation in a drug treatment
court is not mandatory, nor is there a fundamental right to participate. 50
While drug courts vary across different localities, there are three
main drug court models nationally. The first is a deferred prosecution
model, 51 where the participant’s case is diverted to a treatment court
program before the defendant enters into a plea and the case is
processed. 52 Since defendants are not required to plead guilty,
successful completion of the drug court program results in no further
prosecution and often no conviction on his criminal record.53
Alternatively, if the defendant is terminated from the program, his case
will revert to the traditional criminal justice system and he will be
prosecuted and face a criminal conviction. 54 In this model, the
defendant may stipulate to a set of facts when he enters drug court, but
this does not mean he is relinquishing his right to an independent
finding of guilt. 55 A trial court processing a case permissibly withdrawn
eligible participants are also screened for suitability). Specifically, Key Component #3 details
eligibility: “Eligible participants are identified early and promptly placed in the drug court
program.” Id.
49 ROGER H. PETERS & ELIZABETH PEYTON, GUIDELINE FOR DRUG COURTS ON SCREENING
AND ASSESSMENT 10 (1998) (discussing best practices for drug court eligibility screening). The
review of the criminal record usually includes looking at the current charge(s), criminal history,
circumstances of the current offense, and outstanding warrants or additional charges that might
disqualify a defendant from participation in the program. Id. at 10–11. The clinical screening
usually seeks to address the severity of the substance abuse problem and the defendant’s
willingness to participate in a drug treatment program by looking at several factors including:
signs of drug or alcohol intoxication or withdrawal, recent drug testing results, and self-reported
substance abuse. Id. at 11–12.
50 See Oram & Gleckler, supra note 17, at 476, 483.
51 Also known as a pre-plea dispositional model. See WEST HUDDLESTON & DOUGLAS B.
MARLOWE, NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT
ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES
24 (2011).
52 KING & PASQUARELLA, supra note 19, at 3. In this model, the defendant is still innocent
because the diversion to drug court occurs before the individual enters a guilty plea or is
convicted by a judge or jury. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CTR. FOR
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT FOR ADULTS IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 129 (2005) [hereinafter SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT].
53 KING & PASQUARELLA, supra note 19, at 3; see also HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra
note 51, at 24 (“[T]he charges will be dismissed upon successful completion of treatment.”).
54 See Washington v. Drum, 225 P.3d 237 (Wash. 2010) (en banc) (holding that a drug court
contract is not equivalent to a guilty plea, but is more akin to a deferred prosecution);
HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 51, at 24 (“Because no guilty plea is formally entered,
the case resumes processing through the criminal justice system in the event of an unsuccessful
termination.”).
55 Drum, 225 P.3d at 242 (“By entering a drug court contract, a defendant is not giving up his
right to an independent finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A trial court still has the
authority to find the defendant not guilty if it determines that the stipulated evidence does not
establish all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”). In this case, Drum was arrested
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from a drug court must still make a determination of the legal
sufficiency of the stipulated evidence in order to convict. 56 However,
the participant runs the risk of being sentenced more harshly if, after
termination from drug court, prosecution proceeds and results in a
conviction. 57 While the original drug court in Miami Dade County was
a deferred prosecution model, 58 only twelve percent of adult drug courts
nationwide employed this model as of 2009. 59
A second model of drug court is the post-plea model, which is one
of the most widely used models in the United States. 60 In the post-plea
model, defendants are required to enter a guilty plea, but their sentences
are deferred or suspended while they participate in the drug court
program. 61 By pleading guilty, the defendant thereby waives his right to
be prosecuted in the traditional system, and he voluntarily enters into
drug court. 62 The plea agreement explains the terms of the drug court
for burglary and petitioned for entry into a drug court program, after which the State conceded
that his offense was likely substance abuse related. Id. at 239. The court approved pre-plea
diversion to a treatment court, though after forty days of waiting to be placed in a program, Drum
requested to be released from the drug court contract. Id. at 240. The trial court found Drum
guilty of residential burglary and sentenced him to thirteen months, which the Court of Appeals
affirmed and held that, when Drum signed the contract, he waived any right to challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence. Id. at 240–41. The Supreme Court of Washington ultimately clarified
that a defendant in this drug court model does not give up his right to an “independent finding” of
guilt. Id. at 242.
56 Id. at 242.
57 See SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, supra note 52, at 129 (“The decision to order
treatment as part of pretrial diversion typically, though not always, rests with the prosecutor’s
office. The prosecutor offers to cease all prosecution of the case if the defendant completes the
prescribed treatment regimen. However, if the defendant fails to complete the treatment and to
satisfy the other conditions of diversion, he may risk being sentenced more harshly (if
prosecution proceeds and a conviction results) than if the individual had never entered the
diversion program.”). However, this concern does not implicate the same liberty interests during
the drug court proceeding. It is guaranteed that defendants in the deferred prosecution model, if
terminated from drug court, will have the traditional criminal justice system to process their case,
regardless of their drug court participation. See KING & PASQUARELLA, supra note 19 (explaining
that if a defendant enters drug court through a deferred prosecution model and fails to complete
the program, they will be prosecuted).
58 See DRUG STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 10.
59 HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 51, at 24–25. This Note will generally focus on the
other two models, post-plea and post-sentencing, yet it is important to mention the deferred
prosecution model in order to understand the context of the other model and its sub-components.
In the deferred prosecution model, the liberty interests at stake are not as grave since the
defendant has not entered into any plea or admission of guilt, and still has an opportunity for an
independent finding of guilt if terminated from the drug treatment court. As Washington v. Drum
exemplifies, a defendant who enters a drug treatment court contract in the deferred prosecution
model still has the opportunity for an independent finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
regardless of the drug treatment court outcome. Drum, 225 P.3d 237.
60 As of 2009, 58% of adult drug courts followed either a post-plea model or term of
probation/post-adjudication model. HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 51, at 24.
61 KING & PASQUARELLA, supra note 19, at 3.
62 Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Problem-Solving Courts and the
Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. REV. 1459, 1481 (2004).
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program and most jurisdictions use a contract between the court and the
defendant, specifying their respective duties and expectations. 63 The
guilty plea is typically held in abeyance, and successful completion of
the drug court program results in vacatur of the plea, dismissal of the
charges, and sometimes expungement of the offense. 64 In some cases,
the defendant might be permitted to withdraw his plea and re-plead to a
lesser offense. 65 However, if the defendant is terminated from drug
court due to non-compliance, he will be sentenced to a term of
punishment, including, possibly, incarceration. 66
The third drug court model is a post-sentencing model. 67 Here, the
defendant enters a guilty plea and is sentenced to probation, but
successful completion of drug treatment court is a condition of his
probation. 68 For example, Gardner v. State 69 demonstrates the ability of
a defendant to have an opportunity to enter drug court as a term of his
probation. 70 In this case, the defendant was sentenced to concurrent

63
64

Id. at 1482.
See KING & PASQUARELLA, supra note 19, at 3; HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note
51, at 24 (“[T]he guilty plea or stipulated agreement is held in abeyance and is vacated or
withdrawn upon successful completion of treatment. In addition, many of these programs may
expunge the record of the arrest or conviction if the participant remains arrest-free for an
additional waiting period. Although the record is usually not literally erased from criminal
databases, record expungement ordinarily entitles the individual to respond truthfully on an
employment application or similar document that the arrest or conviction did not occur.”); see
also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 216.05 (McKinney 2015) (“Upon the court’s determination that
the defendant has successfully completed the required period of alcohol or substance abuse
treatment and has otherwise satisfied the conditions required for successful completion of the
judicial diversion program, the court shall comply with the terms and conditions it set for final
disposition when it accepted the defendant’s agreement to participate in the judicial diversion
program. Such disposition may include, but is not limited to . . . allowing the defendant to
withdraw his or her guilty plea and dismissing the indictment.”).
65 Casey, supra note 62, at 1482 (“If the defendant successfully completes the treatment
program, the court will expunge the conviction or the defendant will be permitted to withdraw his
plea and re-plead to a lesser offense.”).
66 DRUG STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 12 (“Some courts are crowded with repeat drug
offenders. . . . Although they are often not violent criminals, they face increasingly severe
penalties for each subsequent conviction. Most prosecutors are unwilling to defer prosecution in
such cases. But they may agree to consider more lenient sentencing if drug abusers plea guilty
and participate in treatment prior to sentencing. These offenders have more entrenched drug
habits, and are harder to treat. By proceeding to prosecution, the district attorney is assured that
those who do not succeed in treatment will be sentenced.”).
67 Also known as a post-adjudication or term of probation model. HUDDLESTON &
MARLOWE, supra note 51, at 24.
68 Id. (“The record of the conviction stands, but participants can avoid incarceration or reduce
their probation obligations.”).
69 577 S.E.2d 69 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
70 Another case that illustrates this model is Anglin v. Arkansas, where the defendant was
arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug
paraphernalia. Anglin v. Arkansas, 249 S.W.3d 836 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007). The defendant plead
guilty to the charges and agreed to a thirty-six month probation and placement in drug treatment
court. Id. at 837. After committing several drug court violations, her probation was revoked. Id. at
838.
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eight year probation on two convictions for violations of the Georgia
Controlled Substances Act. 71 The defendant was subsequently arrested
after failing to report to his probation officer and, as a result, the court
revoked eight years of probation and sentenced him to serve six months,
conditioned upon entering and successfully completing a drug court
program. 72 Once he was again released on probation, the defendant
failed to report to the drug court program and was thereafter brought to
court for a revocation hearing. 73 The main difference of the postsentencing model, as compared to the post-plea model, is that regardless
of successful participation in drug court, the conviction still remains on
the defendant’s record. 74 The main incentive for participating in drug
court within a post-sentencing model is avoiding incarceration or
reducing probation obligations. 75
B.

Federal Standards for Right to Counsel in a Criminal Proceeding

Though designed to be non-adversarial, drug court proceedings are
nonetheless part of a criminal prosecution, regardless of which drug
court model is employed by a particular jurisdiction. 76 Accordingly,
drug courts implicate the right to counsel and an overview of the
constitutional right to counsel in traditional criminal proceedings is
crucial to understanding the role of counsel within the drug court
context.
1.

Right to Counsel and Due Process

The Sixth Amendment explicitly provides a defendant the right to
counsel in all criminal prosecutions. 77 The Supreme Court has further
71
72
73

Gardner, 577 S.E.2d at 69.
Id.
Id. at 70. At the probation revocation hearing, the court revoked his four-year probation as
a result of the violation of his probationary condition of drug court attendance. Id. at 69. The main
issue on appeal was whether drug court participation was a “special condition” of probation to
authorize the court to revoke four years of probation or whether it was a “general condition” of
probation, meaning the court could only revoke two years. Id. at 69.
74 See HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 51, at 24.
75 See id.
76 The earliest point at which a defendant may enter drug court is once adversarial
proceedings against a defendant have begun. Either the prosecution is deferred pending drug
court completion, a plea is entered and sentencing is diverted pending drug court completion, or a
defendant has already been sentenced and drug court is a condition of their probation. See
discussion supra Section I.A. (discussing the three main drug court models).
77 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment reads: “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
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expanded and clarified the meaning of the right to counsel and its
application in both federal and state courts. 78 The assistance of counsel
is a constitutional element of a federal criminal court proceeding unless
the right is intelligently and competently waived. 79 The landmark case,
Gideon v. Wainwright, 80 held that this right to counsel is so fundamental
and essential to a fair trial that it is also applicable to the states pursuant
to the Fourteenth Amendment. 81
The right to counsel is a constitutional safeguard that’s necessary
to assist individuals in facing the government as their adversary. 82 This
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” Id.
78 See generally Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel extends to all
felony prosecutions and to misdemeanor prosecutions where incarceration may be imposed);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (applying right to counsel to the state level through
the Fourteenth Amendment); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (counsel must be provided
in federal courts for defendants unable to employ counsel, unless the right is competently and
intelligently waived).
79 Johnson, 304 U.S. at 467–68 (“Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one
charged with crime to the assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an
essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court’s authority to deprive an accused of his life
or liberty. When this right is properly waived, the assistance of counsel is no longer a necessary
element of the court’s jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence.”). However, if a
defendant without counsel acquiesces in a trial, the burden of proof is on him to establish that he
did not waive his right to counsel competently or intelligently. Id. at 468–69 (emphasis added).
The standard for right to counsel in federal court is embodied in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure: “A defendant who is unable to obtain counsel is entitled to have counsel appointed to
represent the defendant at every stage of the proceeding from initial appearance through appeal,
unless the defendant waives this right.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(a).
80 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
81 See id. at 339; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”). In a case prior to Gideon, the Court considered this question
and after analyzing historical data, concluded that the appointment of counsel is not a
fundamental right and therefore not obligatory upon the States pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). After considering a long line of precedent
concerning the constitutional principles that ensure a fair system of justice, the Court in Gideon
concluded that a defendant cannot be assured a fair trial without the right to counsel and that this
right is incumbent on the states in all felony cases. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (“Not only these
precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth.”). This right
to counsel was further expanded when Argersinger held that due process requires counsel in any
criminal case, whether misdemeanor or felony, that actually leads to imprisonment. Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
82 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (recognizing that defense counsel could
provide some parity between a layperson and the government prosecuting his case); Pamela R.
Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel Doctrine, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 1635, 1642 (2003) (“[T]he Court echoed the colonists’ views about counsel and addressed
the tremendous advantage a public prosecutor had over an unrepresented defendant. The Court
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right embodies the recognition that a defendant may not have the
professional capability to adequately defend himself without the
assistance of counsel when brought in front of a court with the power to
deprive him of his liberty. 83 Without defense counsel, the procedural
safeguards that assure a fair trial before an impartial tribunal are
threatened. 84
A liberty interest is a broad constitutional concept that refers to the
basic interests possessed by citizens of a free society. 85 This interest is
not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint, but includes a full
range of conduct which an individual is free to pursue. 86 Once a
protected liberty interest is identified, the subsequent determination is
exactly how much process is due. 87 When a state seeks to deprive
someone of a recognized liberty interest, Courts may turn to the
balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge. 88 This test requires a
balancing of (1) the private interest affected, (2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of the interest through the procedures used, and (3) the
acknowledged that the complexity of the legal system increased the prosecutor’s advantage.
Faced with the complex ‘science of law’ and the rules of evidence, a layperson could not mount a
meaningful defense. The Court also considered the risk of substantial prejudice that might befall
an unrepresented defendant.”).
83 See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462–63 (explaining that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment is
to provide defendants an opportunity to effectively advocate their cases through the assistance of
effective defense counsel, considering the experienced and professional prosecutor for any given
case); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
84 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
85 See 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1889 (2016) (“Liberty protected by due process is a
broad concept that extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue and
cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental objective. . . . ‘Liberty’ within the Due
Process Clauses applies to those basic interests which are possessed by citizens of a free society
and to those additional interests which are created by the State for the benefit and enjoyment of its
people.”).
86 See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (“Without doubt, it
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract,
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.”) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)); see
also Adam D. Young, Comment, An Analysis of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel as It
Applies to Suspended Sentences and Probation: Do Argersinger and Scott Blow a Flat Note on
Gideon’s Trumpet?, 107 DICK. L. REV. 699, 713 (2003) (explaining that the Supreme Court is
concerned with deprivations of liberty in a broad context, extending beyond actual
imprisonment).
87 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects an individual from being
deprived of a constitutional liberty interest without due process of law. See 16C C.J.S.
Constitutional Law § 1887 (2016) (“However, due process does not protect against all
deprivations of liberty but only against deprivations of liberty accomplished without due process
of law, and only governmental actions which intrude upon personal liberties arbitrarily or in an
utterly unreasonable manner violate the Due Process Clause.”).
88 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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Government’s interest. 89 Due process is not a static concept, rather, it is
flexible and affords the appropriate procedural protections necessary for
different situations. 90 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
concluded that due process demands that a defendant have the right to
counsel at “critical stages” of a criminal proceeding. 91
2.

The Critical Stage Doctrine

Exactly when a defendant is entitled to her right to counsel is a
complex matter. Broadly speaking, under the Sixth Amendment,92
defendants have a right to counsel at “critical stages” of a criminal
proceeding. 93 What constitutes a critical stage of any given criminal
proceeding has been molded and defined by numerous Supreme Court
decisions. 94 In general, a critical stage is one which affects the ultimate
disposition of the charge against the defendant through an adverse
consequence or lost opportunity that could have been either prevented
or gained had counsel been present. 95
89 Id. at 335 (“[D]ue process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First,
the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.”).
90 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“It has been said so often by this Court
and others as not to require citation of authority that due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”).
91 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) (“[T]oday’s law enforcement
machinery involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial
proceedings where the results might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a
mere formality. In recognition of these realities of modern criminal prosecution, our cases have
construed the Sixth Amendment guarantee to apply to ‘critical’ stages of the proceedings.”); see
also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972) (“The requirement of counsel may well be
necessary for a fair trial even in a petty-offense prosecution.”); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128,
134 (1967) (“[Supreme Court cases including Gideon and Hamilton], clearly stand for the
proposition that appointment of counsel for an indigent is required at every stage of a criminal
proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected.”).
92 As noted above, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was incorporated into the states
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
93 While all stages are arguably “critical,” one Supreme Court case defined “critical stage” to
be an event when the accused requires aid in coping with legal problems or help in meeting his
adversary. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973). Only stages of a “criminal
prosecution” can be critical stages. As specified in the Sixth Amendment, a defendant is entitled
to defense counsel only in a “criminal prosecution.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
94 See generally Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478, 492 (1964) (holding that where the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime, but is rather focused on a particular suspect, an interrogation of that person after
being denied counsel may not be used against them at trial); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52
(1961) (arraignment is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding under Alabama law).
95 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.2(b) (4th ed. 2015) (“In

Kirschenheiter.2017 (Do Not Delete)

2017]

6/27/2017 4:59 PM

D R U G S A N D TH E R I G H T T O C O U N S E L

83

There are several examples of when the right to counsel attaches,
and consequently which proceedings are so “critical” as to require the
assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court has held that the right to
counsel attaches at the commencement of judicial proceedings against a
defendant, whether by “formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment.” 96 In a fairly recent case, the Court further
clarified that a defendant’s initial appearance in front of a judge,
whereupon he learns of his charges, marks the start of the adversary
proceeding and thus implicates a right to counsel. 97 However, beyond
the initiation of adversary proceedings, exactly when a defendant is
entitled to counsel at the various proceedings that comprise a criminal
trial is more difficult to determine.
One way that courts have defined whether any particular stage of
the proceeding is “critical” is by evaluating whether it held significant
consequences for the accused. 98 Brewer v. Williams 99 concerned a
situation where several incriminating statements were made by a
defendant during a drive with a police officer, despite the defendant’s

determining whether a judicial proceeding meets the ‘critical stage’ standard, a court must ask:
(1) whether the proceeding either (i) had a consequence adverse to the defendant as to the
ultimate disposition of the charge which could have been avoided or mitigated if defendant had
been represented by counsel at that proceeding, or (ii) offered a potential opportunity for
benefitting the defendant as to the ultimate disposition of the charge through rights that could
have been exercised by counsel, and (2) whether that adverse consequence could have been
avoided, or the lost opportunity regained, by action that subsequently provided counsel could
have taken.”).
96 See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188–89 (1984); Brewer, 430 U.S. at 398
(“[T]he right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a
person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been
initiated against him ‘whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment.’”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, arraignment is considered a
critical stage of a traditional criminal proceeding. See Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 53 (“Arraignment
under Alabama law is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding.”). The reason for this is that
whatever happens at arraignment may affect the whole trial. Id.
97 Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 212 (2008). The court also clarified that the
prosecutor’s involvement in the case is not an indicator of when adversary proceedings
commence. See id. While the defendant had never committed a felony, a background check on
him disclosed an erroneous record indicating that he was a felon. Id. at 195. The defendant’s
repeated requests for counsel were denied until six months after the initial hearing, whereupon the
appointment of counsel swiftly confirmed the erroneous record and the indictment was dismissed.
Id. at 196–97. In the meantime, defendant was indicted and spent three weeks in jail since he
could not afford bail. Id. at 196. Once the defense lawyer was appointed and the proper
paperwork was filed, the indictment was dismissed. Id. at 196–97. Subsequently, the defendant
brought suit alleging that the court’s policy of denying appointed counsel until at least the entry
of an information or indictment violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 197.
98 See Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695–96
(2002) (“A trial would be presumptively unfair, we said, where the accused is denied the presence
of counsel at ‘a critical stage,’ a phrase we used . . . to denote a step of a criminal proceeding,
such as arraignment, that held significant consequences for the accused.”) (citations omitted).
99 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
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hesitation to speak in the absence of an attorney. 100 The defendant had
already been arraigned, so it was without question that proceedings had
already been initiated against him. 101 Therefore, the Court held that at
the time the police interrogated the defendant during the car ride, he was
entitled to counsel. 102 While this car ride was clearly not a formal
proceeding within the criminal trial, the statements made by the
defendant in response to the interrogations were made in the absence of
legal representation and ultimately affected the disposition of his
charge, therefore this was a critical stage of the criminal proceeding. 103
The period of time leading up to trial is vitally important, thus
some pre-trial stages, once adversary proceedings have begun, are
considered critical stages requiring defense counsel. 104 However, the
Court did suggest that there are certain pre-trial activities which the
right does not cover, indicating that whether or not an activity is a
critical stage is often an extremely fact specific exercise. 105 For
example, United States v. Ash required the Court to consider whether
100 Id. at 392–93. The police officers also knew that the defendant had a history of mental
illness and was deeply religious, both characteristics that were taken advantage of when
essentially coercing the defendant to admit to the crime without the presence of his attorney. Id. at
392. At this point, defendant had just been arraigned in Davenport after surrendering himself to
local police and was being transported to Des Moines. Id. at 390–91. It was made explicitly clear
that the police officers transporting him would not question him during the trip. Id. at 391.
101 Id. at 399 (“There can be no doubt in the present case that judicial proceedings had been
initiated against Williams before the start of the automobile ride from Davenport to Des Moines.
A warrant had been issued for his arrest, he had been arraigned on that warrant before a judge in a
Davenport courtroom, and he had been committed by the court to confinement in jail.”).
102 Id. at 401 (“[O]nce adversary proceedings have commenced against an individual, he has a
right to legal representation when the government interrogates him. . . . Williams was entitled to
the assistance of counsel guaranteed to him by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.”). The
Court declined to find that the defendant had properly waived his right to counsel during the car
ride interrogation. Id. at 404–05. The standard for determining whether a waiver is constitutional
requires the State to prove that the defendant intentionally abandoned or relinquished a known
right. Id. at 404 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). The Court subsequently
held that this standard for proving intentional waiver of right to counsel applied not only at trial,
but at a critical stage of pretrial proceedings. Id. Here, defendant did not knowingly relinquish his
right to counsel, as evidenced by his constant reliance on defense counsel up to this point coupled
with the police officer’s lack of informing defendant he had any rights at all at that time. Id. at
404–05.
103 Id. at 393–94, 401. Additionally, the State must prove an intentional waiver at a critical
stage of pretrial proceedings or at trial. Id. at 404.
104 See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 159–60 (1985) (“The assistance of counsel is
necessary to safeguard the other procedural safeguards provided to the accused by the criminal
justice process. Accordingly, the right to the assistance of counsel is not limited to participation in
a trial; to deprive a person of counsel during the period prior to trial may be more damaging than
denial of counsel during the trial itself.”); see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)
(“[D]uring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants, that is to
say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation,
thorough-going investigation and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did not have
the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid during that
period as at the trial itself.”).
105 See generally United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
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counsel is required when the Government conducts a post-indictment
photograph display for witness identification of the offender. 106 After
examining the expansion of the Sixth Amendment, the Court concluded
that the test for determining whether a proceeding is a critical stage
hinges on whether the accused needed assistance in facing his
adversary. 107 Thus, in Ash, the Court held that the defendant did not
have a right to counsel during the photo lineup. 108 In reaching its
conclusion, the Court considered the nature of the photographic lineup
and its overall implication on the adversary process. 109 Since the
photographic display did not present an opportunity for the prosecutor
to unfairly prejudice the defendant, it was not a critical stage requiring
the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment. 110 Therefore, in determining
whether or not any particular proceeding is a “critical stage,” a court
must evaluate whether the proceeding will prejudice the defendant
substantially, and whether the presence of counsel can prevent that
prejudice. 111
3.

Probation Revocation Hearings

Whether post trial proceedings are part of the “criminal
prosecution” 112 within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment depends on

106 Id. at 300–01. The Court focused on the historical interpretation of the right to counsel
guarantee, noting that in order to keep pace with modern criminal proceedings, the Sixth
Amendment right has been construed to apply to “critical stages.” Id. at 309–11 (citation
omitted).
107 Id. at 313 (“This review of the history and expansion of the Sixth Amendment counsel
guarantee demonstrates that the test utilized by the Court has called for examination of the event
in order to determine whether the accused required aid in coping with legal problems or
assistance in meeting his adversary.”); see also Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without
Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333, 336 n.15 (2011) (“The standard focuses on the importance
of the rights of an accused that are at risk without counsel’s presence, such as pretrial liberty and
the privilege against self-incrimination, rather than on the ultimate outcome of the infrequent
trial.”).
108 Ash, 413 U.S. at 317. The Court reasoned that since the accused himself was not present at
the lineup and asserted no right to be present, there is no possibility that he would be led astray by
his lack of knowledge about the law in that situation. Id.
109 Id. at 317–21 (“We are not persuaded that the risks inherent in the use of photographic
displays are so pernicious that an extraordinary system of safeguards is required.”).
110 Id. at 320–21. A defendant is presumed to have suffered an unconstitutional prejudice if
right to counsel is denied at a critical stage within a traditional criminal proceeding. See also
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
111 See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658–60; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (“It calls
upon us to analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres in the
particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.”).
112 Thereby requiring assistance of counsel, since the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
guarantee applies to all “criminal prosecutions.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
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whether the proceeding pertains to the original offense or to the
defendant’s subsequent conduct while on probation. 113 For example,
although probation revocation hearings usually deal with conduct of the
defendant subsequent to his case and are generally not part of the initial
criminal prosecution, 114 the right to counsel may still attach at a stage
beyond a “criminal prosecution” when due process requires the
assistance of counsel in order to ensure a fair hearing. 115 Accordingly, in
considering whether procedural protections should be in place in parole
and probation revocation hearings, courts may consider whether the
defendant will suffer a “grievous loss” on behalf of the State. 116
The Supreme Court has declined to make a hard and fast
constitutional rule requiring counsel in probation or parole revocation
hearings. 117 In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the defendant—who was charged
with armed robbery and subsequently sentenced to probation for seven
years—had his probation revoked without a hearing. 118 The Gagnon
113 Compare Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (holding that a probation revocation
proceeding is part of a criminal proceeding when it required setting the defendant’s prison time),
with Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (holding that the probation revocation hearing was
not part of the criminal prosecution when the issue is probation revocation, since that only deals
with the defendant’s subsequent conduct while in the rehabilitative probation stage, not the
commission of the original offense). In Mempa, the Court delineated a rule regarding counsel at
probation revocation hearings that occurred pre-sentencing. Mempa, 389 U.S. at 137. This is
because sentencing is considered a stage of the criminal prosecution, therefore probation in this
situation occurred before the end of the criminal prosecution. For the purposes of this Note, I will
assume that when a defendant is in drug court as a condition of their probation, this term of
probation has occurred post-sentencing. See discussion supra Section I.A. (discussing the postsentencing drug court model).
114 See Gagnon, 411 U.S. 778. Probation is an alternative to incarceration in which a convicted
individual may serve all or part of his sentence at liberty, subject to supervision. Daniel F. Piar, A
Uniform Code of Procedure for Revoking Probation, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117, 117 (2003). A
probationer is usually required to report to a probation officer regularly, as well as comply with
certain elements set as conditions of his probation. Id. at 118. “If a probationer fails to comply
with his conditions, he can be charged with a probation violation and brought back before the
court. If the state can prove that the terms of probation were violated, then the probation can be
revoked, and what began as conditional liberty can become a term of incarceration.” Id. By
contrast, parole is release from prison, before the completion of a sentence, on the condition that
the parolee follows certain regulations. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972). The
purpose of parole is to allow a defendant to integrate back into society before the end of his
sentence. Id. Parolees are entitled to retain their liberty so long as they abide by certain
conditions, and if such conditions are violated, the parole officer has broad discretion to revoke
parole. Id. at 479.
115 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 70–71 (1932).
116 See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481 (“Whether any procedural protections are due depends on
the extent to which an individual will be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss.’ . . . The question is
not merely the ‘weight’ of the individual’s interest, but whether the nature of the interest is one
within the contemplation of the ‘liberty or property’ language of the Fourteenth Amendment.”)
(citations omitted); Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 781–82.
117 Gagnon, 411 U.S. 778.
118 Id. at 779–80 (explaining that respondent was apprehended by police during the course of a
house burglary, which was in direct violation of his probation regulations). Respondent was
subsequently incarcerated to begin serving the 15-year term that was sentenced to him by the trial
judge—without a hearing. Id.
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Court 119 held that a probationer is entitled to minimum due process
requirements including a preliminary hearing and a final revocation
hearing. 120 However, the Court rejected an absolute right to counsel in
all probation revocation hearings, and instead proposed a case-by-case
analysis that should be limited to cases where fundamental fairness and
due process require it. 121 While the right to counsel may be undesirable
and constitutionally unnecessary in some cases, the Court nevertheless
held that counsel is presumptively required where (1) a defendant
makes a colorable claim that he has not committed the violations at
issue and (2) where the mitigating factors might be difficult to develop
or present. 122 Additionally, the Court said to consider whether the
defendant appears to be capable of speaking for himself. 123
While the Supreme Court opted out of a per se rule requiring
counsel in probation hearings, several states have established a blanket
right to counsel, either by statute or on state constitutional grounds. 124
119 In Gagnon, the Court considered precedent when making its decision. See Gagnon, 411
U.S. 778. Mempa involved consolidated cases that all raised the question of whether counsel was
required in cases where sentencing was deferred, subject to probation. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S.
128, 130 (1967). The court held that a probationer is entitled to counsel at combined revocation
and sentencing hearings because substantive rights of the defendant may be affected. Id. at 134–
37 (deferred sentencing, even when part of probation revocation hearing, requires defense
counsel). In Morrissey, the court considered parole revocation. Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471. While
parole is not part of a criminal prosecution, the potential loss of liberty is a serious deprivation
that warrants due process. Id. at 482–83. The Court held that a parolee is entitled to both a
preliminary hearing when the parolee is arrested and detained, and a revocation hearing if so
desired by the parolee. Id. at 485–89. However, the Court declined to render a decision about
whether the parolee is entitled to the assistance of counsel at these hearings. Id. at 489.
120 Prior to this decision, no court had held that a probationer was entitled to a revocation
hearing, so the Court extended the Morrissey decision that required a hearing for parole
revocation. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782; see also Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488.
121 Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790 (“We think, rather, that the decision as to the need for counsel
must be made on a case-by-case basis in the exercise of a sound discretion by the state authority
charged with responsibility for administering the probation and parole system. Although the
presence and participation of counsel will probably be both undesirable and constitutionally
unnecessary in most revocation hearings, there will remain certain cases in which fundamental
fairness—the touchstone of due process—will require that the State provide at its expense
counsel for indigent probationers or parolees.”). However, the Court has recognized the principle
that even conditional liberty is liberty. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479–80, 482 (“The liberty of a
parolee enables him to do a wide range of things open to persons who have never been convicted
of any crime. . . . [T]he liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core
values of unqualified liberty . . . .”).
122 Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790. Moreover, the Court provided guidelines for when counsel
should be provided, most notably, if the probationer or parolee makes a request for counsel after
being informed of his right to request such. Counsel should be provided if probationer or parolee
makes such a request, based on a claim “(i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the
conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public record
or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation. . . .” Id.
123 Id. at 790–91. The Court in Gagnon weighed the interests of both the defendant and the
government. Id. at 787.
124 See Piar, supra note 114, at 136 (“By contrast, some states have established a blanket right
to counsel, either by statute or on independent state constitutional grounds. Congress likewise has
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These state statutes generally provide the right to be represented by
counsel at a probation or parole hearing and require counsel to be
appointed if the defendant is unable to obtain counsel on his own. 125 If a
state does not establish a blank right to counsel through statue, whether
right to counsel in a probation revocation hearing attaches requires an
analysis of the factors presented above and a consideration of whether
the particular revocation requires due process. 126
4.

Effective Assistance of Counsel

Beyond when the right to counsel attaches, drug courts also
implicate how this right applies, especially considering the diminished
role of the defense attorney in a drug court proceeding. 127 The right to
counsel includes the right to effective assistance of such counsel. 128 If
counsel fails to zealously advocate for the defendant through
meaningful adversarial testing of the prosecutor’s case, Sixth
Amendment rights have been denied.129 Effective assistance of counsel
provided a right to counsel in all federal probation revocation hearings.”).
125 See OHIO CRIM. R. 32.3(B) (2016) (“The defendant shall have the right to be represented
by retained counsel and shall be so advised. Where a defendant convicted of a serious offense is
unable to obtain counsel, counsel shall be assigned to represent the defendant, unless the
defendant after being fully advised of his or her right to assigned counsel, knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waives the right to counsel.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-32
(2013) (“[S]hall be advised by the court that such defendant has the right to retain counsel and, if
indigent, shall be entitled to the services of the public defender . . . .”); KANS. STAT. ANN. § 223716(b) (2015) (“The defendant shall have the right to be represented by counsel and shall be
informed by the judge that, if the defendant is financially unable to obtain counsel, an attorney
will be appointed to represent the defendant.”).
126 See Gagnon, 411 U.S. 778. As recognized by other legal scholars, the case-by-case
approach suggested in Gagnon v. Scarpelli is untenable and inefficient, and the state statutes
entitling probationers and parolees with counsel in any revocation hearing are preferred. See Piar,
supra note 114, at 138 (“Providing counsel in all cases would ensure that someone who is being
haled into court to face the loss of liberty will not go alone, and at the least, that all possible
arguments and evidence will be presented to the court before revocation is imposed. The case-bycase approach of Gagnon is neither efficient nor fair, and a probationer should be entitled to
counsel in any revocation hearing.”).
127 See discussion infra Section II.B.
128 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (“It has long been recognized that
the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”).
129 See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (“Similarly, if counsel entirely fails
to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of
Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.”). The
heart of this case deals with whether defense counsel’s performance is presumptively
unconstitutional given lack of time to prepare for a case, so as to render the adversary process
prejudiced as a matter of law. Id. at 656–62. The Court concluded that “[o]nly when surrounding
circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness can a Sixth Amendment claim be
sufficient without inquiry into counsel’s actual performance at trial.” Id. at 662. Another situation
where counsel’s performance may be presumptively unconstitutional is when no counsel, whether
competent or not, could effectively assist the accused during trial. Id. at 660–61 (discussing
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
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is not required to be perfect or error-free; rather, “effectiveness” is
measured by a standard of general competency of defense attorneys in
criminal cases generally. 130 The general test for determining whether a
defendant has a viable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel asks
whether counsel’s performance was deficient, and whether the
defendant was unfairly prejudiced by this deficiency. 131 Therefore, by
constitutionally requiring counsel during critical stages of a criminal
prosecution, the defendant is assured zealous representation as part of
that Sixth Amendment right.
II. IDENTIFYING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL PROBLEM IN THE DRUG COURT
MODEL
The right to counsel and effective assistance of such counsel are
based on adversarial proceedings, which is problematic when
attempting to apply to the non-adversarial drug court model. 132
However, the legal principles that underlie the critical stage doctrine,
probation revocation law, and the effective assistance of counsel can be
applied to the stages of a drug court proceeding to reconcile the drug
court model with the constitutional protections due to each participant.
A.

Lack of Defense Counsel During Drug Court Proceedings May
Implicate Liberty Interests of Defendants

While there is a well-established doctrine for what constitutes a
critical stage in a traditional criminal proceeding, courts have not
definitively addressed which drug court proceedings constitute critical
stages for Sixth Amendment right to counsel purposes. Whether the
non-traditional aspects of drug court proceedings, including staffings 133
and status hearings, 134 implicate a constitutional right to counsel is a
130 See generally Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 18 (2013) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment does not
guarantee the right to perfect counsel; it promises only the right to effective assistance . . . .”);
Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S.Ct. 1081, 1081 (2014) (discussing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 685–87 (1984)) (“[D]efendants are entitled to be represented by an attorney who meets at
least a minimal standard of competence.”).
131 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
132 See discussion supra Section I.A. (discussing the drug court model and its features
generally).
133 Staffings are the meetings behind closed doors between the judge, prosecutor, defense
attorney and treatment staff, held prior to a defendant’s status hearing. See ORR ET AL., supra
note 37, at 30–31.
134 At status hearings, sanctions may be imposed on defendants who do not comply with the
drug court rules and procedures by testing positive for drugs. They range from admonishment
from the judge in open court to incarceration. See KEY COMPONENTS, supra note 28, at 13–15.
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question that is currently left unanswered. As presented in Part I, a
defendant’s right to counsel in various stages of a criminal proceeding
often hinges on whether a defendant had a liberty interest at stake.135
However, as the example below illustrates, if defense counsel is not
required at the non-traditional proceedings of drug court, a defendant’s
liberty interests may be gradually eroded without due process of law.
The lack of defense counsel during several stages of a drug court
proceeding, including staffings and all status hearings, 136 may adversely
affect a defendant’s liberty interests due to the potentially cumulative
effect of sanctions. Consider the following hypothetical: Defendant
enters the drug treatment court one day for her regularly scheduled
appearance and tests positive for cocaine. This is the first time she has
tested positive for drugs while participating in the program. The
presiding judge sanctions her to court observation for the day. 137 No
defense counsel is present at the staffing or the status hearing, but the
liberty interest at stake is fairly minimal. 138 On her next court
appearance, the Defendant again tests positive for cocaine. This time,
the judge sanctions her to write an essay reflecting on why she chose to
break compliance with the drug court rules. 139 Again, no defense
135 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (“The Sixth Amendment guarantees that:
‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.’ This is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed
necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty.”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“[A]ny person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36–
37 (1972) (“We must conclude, therefore, that the problems associated with misdemeanor and
petty offenses often require the presence of counsel to insure the accused a fair trial. . . . We hold,
therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by
counsel at his trial.”).
136 Regardless of what type of sanction is being imposed, if any at all.
137 Often, court observation is used as a sanction. Sanctions for noncompliance, as detailed in
Key Component #6, include: Warnings and admonishment from the bench in open court,
demotion to earlier program phases, increased frequency of testing and court appearances,
confinement in the courtroom or jury box, increased monitoring and/or treatment intensity, fines,
required community service or work programs, escalating periods of jail confinement, termination
from the program and reinstatement of regular court practices. KEY COMPONENTS, supra note 28,
at 13–14.
138 Michael Tobin, Participation of Defense Attorneys in Drug Courts, 8 DRUG CT. REV. 96,
114 (2012) (“[I]n most Drug Courts, the attorney does not attend the court’s regular review
hearings, even when the defendant faces a sanction for noncompliance.”).
139 The National Drug Court Research Center provides a list of incentives and sanctions
compiled from various drug court practices across the country. Essay writing is considered a
“low” sanction in terms of magnitude and severity. Essay assignment examples include reflection
upon the following: definition of recovery, relapse triggers, drug refusal skills, managing
cravings, lying and dishonesty, the disease of addiction, the impact of addiction on the family, the
role of treatment, and the role of peer support groups. List of Incentives and Sanctions, NAT’L
ASS’N OF DRUG CT. PROFS., NAT’L DRUG CT. INST., https://jpo.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/11204/
3546/NADCP%20List%20of%20incentives%20and%20sanctions.pdf?sequence=1 (last visited
Oct. 12, 2015).
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counsel is present, but perhaps this is not too concerning given the
minimal intrusion on the defendant’s liberty interests. On the third
consecutive appearance, Defendant tests positive a third time for
cocaine. Considering the prior two sanctions, the judge now sanctions
the Defendant to jail for three days. Perhaps now a defense attorney is
called into court, but they will be at a disadvantage due to their absence
from the proceedings involving the first two sanctions. The judge has
now made her decision based not only on this current drug abuse, but
also the prior two staffings and status hearings in which the defense
counsel was not present at all. This is problematic since these
proceedings are permitted to occur without defense counsel, yet may
have an overall impact on the liberty interests of the defendant.
The National Drug Court Institute (NDCI) 140 promulgated best
practices for the operation of drug courts, 141 which include offering
adversary representation to a defendant in drug court whenever the
defendant faces incarceration as a sanction. 142 However, merely
requiring defense counsel when a defendant faces jail time as a sanction
does not address the problem, for by that time a defendant’s liberty
interests may have been gradually eroded without due process.
B.

The Defense Attorney’s Problematic Role Within a Drug Court
Proceeding

There is no clearly established right to have counsel present at all
stages of a drug court proceeding, including regularly scheduled court
appearances. 143 However, this is potentially problematic because the
sanctions or discussions that occur during the proceedings in which
counsel is not present might ultimately have an overall impact on the
liberty interest of the defendant. The problem is further exacerbated by
the defense attorney’s diminished capacity to zealously and effectively

140 The NDCI is an organization under the National Association of Drug Court Professionals
whose mission is to promote education and research in the drug court field. The NDCI has an
annual publication, Drug Court Review, that keeps drug court practitioners apprised of important
new developments in the field. It provides scientific research, scholarship, and commentary from
drug court practitioners. See generally Drug Court Review, NAT’L DRUG CT. INST.,
https://www.ndci.org/resources/publications/drug-court-review (last visited Apr. 13, 2017).
141 Douglas B. Marlow, Special Issue on Best Practices in Drug Courts, 8 DRUG CT. REV. 1,
1–2 (2012).
142 Tobin, supra note 138, at 111.
143 See Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I On Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender About
Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 64 (2000–2001)
(“[W]ithin the treatment court a culture of informality has developed whereby most players in the
court view the presence of a defense attorney at status hearings as nonessential, even for
scheduled hearings.”).
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advocate for her client. 144 As presented in Part I, a defendant has a right
to counsel once adversarial proceedings have commenced against the
individual. 145 However, since drug treatment courts employ a nonadversarial, teamwork approach, they don’t conform to the traditional
criminal court model. 146 As a result, the traditional roles of the judge,
prosecutor, and defense attorney are recalculated to facilitate the
rehabilitative treatment goals of the drug court model. 147 The changing
role of the defense attorney is particularly important in the context of a
defendant’s right to counsel. The “Key Components” promulgated by
the Department of Justice provide the basic requirements for defense
attorneys working in a drug court. 148 They emphasize taking a step back
and working within the team approach. 149 Yet the Key Concepts neglect
to provide ethical and constitutional guidelines for defense counsel,
leaving them with a difficult choice in how they formulate their role
within the drug court proceeding. 150
144 To illustrate the main tension: Is right to counsel a zealous and effective advocate or simply
a “body” standing next to the defendant?
145 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (“[T]he right to counsel granted by the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or
after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him ‘whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.’”).
146 See Casey, supra note 62, at 1459.

The problem-solving courts represent a dramatic change in the function of the criminal
courts, incorporating an experimentalist theory of governance, where evolving
standards, continuous monitoring and collaboration replace existing structures. The
procedural due process protections accorded to criminal defendants and traditional
barriers to the use of coercion are eliminated, as the adversarial process is abandoned
in favor of a collaborative endeavor involving the judge, prosecutor, defense attorney,
probation officer, treatment provider and defendant. Significantly, the judge becomes
part of the treatment team, rendering decisions not based on law or fact, but on a
program of clinical treatment.
Id.
147
148
149

Id.
See discussion supra Section I.A.
Quinn, supra note 143, at 47.
Defenders need to look at this as a new approach that requires a level of team work and
partnership that is not often seen. It requires defenders to take a step back, to not
intervene actively between the judge and the participant, and allow that relationship to
develop and do its work, and basically to understand the importance of working within
a team concept.

Id. (quoting Judge Jeffery S. Tauber, former presiding judge for the Oakland, California, drug
treatment court and director of the National Drug Court Institute).
150 See Quinn, supra note 143, at 50; see also KEY COMPONENTS, supra note 28, at 11 (“The
responsibility of the defense counsel is to protect the participant’s due process rights while
encouraging full participation.”). What’s interesting is that no further guidelines are promulgated
to describe exactly how this is achieved. Defense attorneys first must decide what posture to
adopt when their client is faced with either entry into a drug court program or continuation
through the traditional criminal court system. During a drug court proceeding, they are faced with
choosing whether to play an active or passive role in limiting the potentially severe sanctions that
may be imposed on their client. See Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug
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Defense attorneys must usually make these difficult decisions on
the fly, during the regular court appearances of their clients, most often
when there is noncompliance by a client and the judge intends to
impose some form of sanction. 151 The notion that the defense attorney
must not intervene makes rational sense from the judge’s perspective,
who views her role as within the best interests of the defendant.152
However, from the defendant’s perspective, even well-intentioned
sanctions may seem too harsh or unfair. 153 If defense counsel decides to
advocate for her client, she runs the risk of undermining the therapeutic
treatment grounded in the direct relationship between the judge and the
defendant. 154 Consequently, defense attorneys in drug court have a
difficult job of balancing when to be zealous advocates and when to
cooperate with the judge’s sanction decision. 155 This tension results
from the obligation to pursue the client’s “stated interests” as opposed
to his “best interests.” 156 In a report by the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), great emphasis is placed on the
defense attorney’s ethical obligation to pursue her client’s expressed
interests, rather than imposing counsel’s view of the client’s “long-term
best interest.” 157 While defense attorneys are required to remain loyal to
Treatment Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 1205, 1254-55 (1998) (“An important question
here is whether defense counsel should interpose himself or herself between the defendant and the
treatment court judge, or acquiesce in the common practice of permitting the judge to interact
directly with defendants in open court.”).
151 Another point where defense counsel’s advocacy is particularly important is during the
defendant’s entry into drug court. “Competent representation requires counsel to ‘fully advise the
client of the advantages and disadvantages,’ which encompasses informed counsel concerning
pretrial motions, the likelihood of conviction, and the consequences of participation.” ORR ET AL.,
supra note 37, at 31 (citation omitted). The issue with advising the client about drug court at this
stage is that counsel might be making assessments about treatment, rather than just the likely
outcome. Id. Additionally, the quick turnaround to drug court expedites the decision making
process, perhaps before a full discussion of drug court benefits and risks can be fully discussed
and evaluated by the counsel and their client. Id.
152 See Boldt, supra note 150, at 1264.
153 See id. at 1264–65.
The conundrum for defenders is how to mediate this clash of perspectives: Should they
proceed principally as members of the treatment team and seek to persuade their clients
that the court’s position has integrity, or should they adopt the point of view of at least
some defendants and seek to undermine the judge’s efforts by raising potentially
available points of law?
Id.
154
155

See id. at 1265.
The concern in having to make such difficult decisions rests in the risk of not complying
with the legal and ethical standards for defense attorneys.
156 ORR ET AL., supra note 37, at 32 (“If the attorney fails to advocate on behalf of the client,
there is a risk that clients will grow to doubt the value of their own rights and will view the
process as a sham because no one is speaking on their behalf.”).
157 Id. at 33; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7, r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). This
ethical obligation arises from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, particularly Rules 1.7
(creates a duty of loyalty, which may be compromised if the attorney cannot consider or carry out
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their clients, this does not necessarily mean minimizing sanctions, but
rather advocating for the client’s interest, whether that is advocating for
sanctions, or contesting them. 158
The largest obstacle preventing the zealous representation of
defendants at a drug court proceeding is the general lack of knowledge
about the drug court model coupled with defense attorneys’ failure to
actively participate in all stages of any given proceeding. 159 Actively
participating, most importantly, requires attendance and advocacy on
the part of the defense attorney during staffings. Although this meeting
is behind closed doors, it is perhaps the best opportunity for counsel to
advance the interests of her client. 160 According to the NACDL report,
however, defense attorneys routinely fail to show up to staffings. 161
Moreover, just showing up is not enough. Defense counsel needs to be
involved in the discussion and decision-making, constantly explaining
their client’s circumstances and bringing to light facts the other
members of the drug court team may not have knowledge of. 162
A defendant’s liberty interests are seriously implicated during
staffings, yet these meetings are off the record and frequently not
attended by defense counsel. 163 These liberty interests are equally at
stake during regular status hearings. 164 The crux of the problem is that
defense counsel is not required to be present at every stage of a drug
an appropriate course of action due to their other responsibilities to be a “team player”) and 1.2
(concerning the scope of a lawyer’s representation, requiring the lawyer to abide by a client’s
decisions concerning the objectives of representation). See ORR ET AL., supra note 37, at 33.
158 See ORR ET AL., supra note 37, at 33.
159 See id. at 31. This includes knowledge not only about the drug court model, but knowledge
about a particular client’s case and all of the nuances that accompany it.
160 See id. (“This meeting may be ‘the most animated, knock-down, drag-out fight,’ but
participants are not part of this crucial discussion about their lives, which is not on the record.”)
(citation omitted). In these meetings, defense counsel should be standing up for her client’s
interests.
161 Id. (“A lawyer from California reported, ‘I did not attend staffing meetings. Thank God.’
Once a participant is admitted to some drug courts in Tennessee they ‘do not see the defense
lawyer anymore.’”) (citations omitted); see also Tobin, supra note 138, at 114 (“The attorney
may negotiate on the client’s behalf regarding participation in Drug Court. . . . However, in most
Drug Courts, the attorney does not attend the court’s regular review hearings, even when the
defendant faces a sanction for noncompliance.”).
162 ORR ET AL., supra note 37, at 31–32. This brings us back to the point of a defense attorney
remaining educated not only in the drug court functions and their obligations as counsel, but in
their particular client’s case. The defense counsel is the one who gets to know the client and is in
the best position to advocate for the client’s position during staffings. There is a huge problem
when defense counsel is uneducated and unfamiliar with her client’s interests, given the
overwhelming importance of attending and advocating for them during staffings. See id. at 32.
163 Id. at 31.
164 See id. at 34 (“As the Bronx Drug Court judge explained, ‘the vast majority just don’t
come.’”). It is often custom for defense attorneys to merely check in every now and then, rather
than appear vigilantly at every stage of the drug court proceeding for their defendants. As the
NACDL report states, “Surprisingly, judges often accept counsel’s absence as part of drug court
practice. There was no judicial testimony about ordering counsel to appear or sanctioning counsel
for nonappearance, as commonly occurs in any other proceeding.” Id. at 34.
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court proceeding, and even when counsel is present, there is often a lack
of zealous advocacy due to the overall culture of teamwork in the
court. 165 These repeated failures, often attributable to case overload, 166
would be resolved if it were a constitutional requirement that counsel be
present at all stages of a drug court proceeding, including staffings and
status hearings.
III. PROPOSAL FOR TREATING DRUG COURT PROCEEDINGS AS CRITICAL
STAGES WHICH REQUIRE ZEALOUS & EFFECTIVE DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
ORDER TO PROTECT DEFENDANTS’ LIBERTY INTERESTS
Despite the teamwork approach and the rehabilitative nature of the
drug court proceeding, it is nonetheless a proceeding that may
significantly affect a participant’s liberty interests, as demonstrated
above. In conforming to the principles underlying the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel jurisprudence, it is logical to conclude that all stages of
a drug court proceeding are so critical to the liberty interests of the
defendant involved that counsel must be constitutionally required at
each stage. Additionally, since the post-sentencing drug court model
allows defendants to divert to drug court as a condition of their
probation, probation revocation hearings provide an analogous context
for considering the right to counsel in drug court termination hearings
within the post-sentencing model. 167 Holding that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel applies to all stages of a drug court proceeding would
require not only the presence of counsel, but the zealous and effective
advocacy of such counsel for each defendant diverted to drug court. 168

165 This lack of advocacy is a result of either complete absence from the proceedings, lack of
ability to prepare for each defendant, or reluctance to interject the interests of the client in
opposition to the teamwork approach.
166 See ORR ET AL., supra note 37, at 35 (“At some point defense attorneys are no longer able
to provide competent representation because of their caseload.”).
167 See discussion supra Section I.B.3. (discussing probation revocation standards).
168 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7, r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). Zealousness “is
treated as a professional virtue and even as an obligation of an ethical attorney toward his or her
client in all of the extant ethical code.” JOHN M. BURKOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS: LAW
AND LIABILITY § 5:2 (2d ed.), Westlaw (database updated July 2016). If defense counsel is
constitutionally required at critical stages of the drug court proceeding, this will inherently
address the problematic issue of the defense attorney’s role within the drug court proceeding. By
remaining present and involved in the drug court process in its entirety, not just when a defendant
faces incarceration, the overall system will better address the needs of the drug court participant
as a defendant.
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The Critical Stages of a Drug Court Proceeding: When the Right
to Counsel Applies

The critical stage doctrine, by its very nature, concerns the
adversarial criminal prosecution process and is designed to assist a
defendant in facing his adversary. 169 Therefore, the non-adversarial
nature of drug court is perhaps the most problematic consideration to
this proposal. Although there may not be any “adversaries,” a defendant
in drug court is still being interrogated by the judge 170 in the presence of
prosecution. As demonstrated through the hypothetical in Part II, a
defendant may be sanctioned to jail, and the stages leading up to that
sanction may greatly impact the judge’s decision to incarcerate. 171 If
counsel is not required at those important stages leading to a sanction,172
the defendant may be deprived of his liberty, through incarceration,
without due process in the form of adequate representation.173
Therefore, it is logical to conclude, considering the critical stage
doctrine, that the defendant should have the assistance of counsel at all
staffings and status hearings, regardless of whether a sanction is
imposed or not due to the potentially cumulative liberty interests at
stake. 174
When a defendant enters drug court through the deferred
prosecution 175 or post-plea 176 drug court models, the adversary

169 See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (holding that a photo line-up for witness
identification was not a critical stage because the photo line-up did not have an overall impact on
the “adversary” process).
170 See ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 19, at 2 (“[T]he direct contact between judges
and participants makes participants vulnerable . . . .”). As explained in the Key Components, the
judge is required to step beyond their role as independent and objective arbiter. See KEY
COMPONENTS, supra note 28, at 27.
171 See discussion supra Section II.A.
172 I.e., staffings and status hearings.
173 See discussion supra Section II.A.
174 The critical stage doctrine also focuses on whether a defendant might be unfairly
prejudiced by a certain proceeding. See Ash, 412 U.S. at 320. Despite the non-adversarial nature
of drug court proceedings, the judge is still questioning and speaking to the defendant in the
presence of a prosecutor. Given the extremely deferential role of the judge in drug court, a
defendant certainly may be unfairly prejudiced in any staffing or status hearing regardless of
whether a sanction is imposed. This is especially true if a defendant’s defense counsel is not
required to be present at all staffings and status hearings and is generally out of the loop for a
majority of the drug court proceedings (i.e., is only called into court if there is some sort of liberty
interest deprivation, such as jail time).
175 The defendant has not entered into a plea or admitted anything. This is a diversion before
prosecution and successful completion of the drug court program results in no further
prosecution. Termination from drug court results in reversion to the traditional criminal justice
system for prosecution. See discussion supra Section I.A.
176 Here, the defendant has entered a guilty plea but the sentencing is deferred or suspended
while they participate in the drug court program. See discussion supra Section I.A. (discussing
the post-plea model).
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proceedings have already begun against the defendant. 177 The right to
counsel in the traditional criminal court context attaches once adversary
proceedings commence and typically lasts through sentencing. 178 Since
both the deferred prosecution and post-plea models divert to drug court
before sentencing, it is logical to consider the diversion to drug court to
be part of the criminal prosecution. More importantly, the proceedings
that occur once a defendant has been diverted to drug court may affect
the ultimate disposition of the defendant’s criminal charge, thus
rendering them “critical.” 179 The outcome of the drug court diversion,
whether successful or not, inherently affects the defendant’s disposition
within the criminal justice system. 180 Therefore, in conforming to the
principles of the critical stage doctrine, all stages 181 of a drug court
proceeding are critical, thereby requiring the assistance of counsel in the
deferred prosecution and post-plea models. 182
177 Adversary proceedings commence at the time judicial proceedings have been initiated,
including: formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, arraignment. See Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1997) (“[T]he right to counsel granted by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after
the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him ‘whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.’”) (citation omitted).
178 See 3 CRIM. PROC. § 11.2(b) (Westlaw 4th ed.) (“Once started, the Sixth Amendment’s
‘criminal prosecution’ continues through to the end of the basic trial stage, including
sentencing.”).
179 See Brewer, 430 U.S. 387 (1997) (where the police interrogation in a car ride in the
absence of counsel was a critical stage because it affected the ultimate disposition of the
defendant’s charge). Considering the way certain stages will affect a defendant’s charge is one
way of thinking about whether a stage is so critical to the criminal prosecution that it requires the
assistance of counsel.
180 In the deferred prosecution model, successful completion of drug court may result in no
further prosecution, but termination will result in reversion to criminal court for prosecution. See
KING & PASQUARELLA, supra note 19, at 3. In the post-plea model, their performance in drug
court may actually affect their sentence length. See DRUG STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 13. In the
deferred prosecution model, if terminated from drug court, the defendant still has an opportunity
to an independent finding of guilt in a traditional criminal court, since no pleas were entered. See
Washington v. Drum, 225 P.3d 237, 242 (Wash. 2010) (en banc). Conversely, in the post-plea
model, the drug court judge is the one who will impose the sentence if the defendant is terminated
from drug court. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 216.05(9)(c) (McKinney 2015) (“[T]he court
may . . . terminate
the
defendant’s
participation
in
the
judicial
diversion
program . . . . Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the court may impose any
sentence authorized for the crime of conviction in accordance with the plea agreement, or any
lesser sentence authorized to be imposed on a felony drug offender . . . taking into account the
length of time the defendant spent in residential treatment and how best to continue treatment
while the defendant is serving that sentence.”). For the purposes of this Note, the New York State
drug court statute will be provided as support. New York State employs a post-plea drug court
model, requiring eligible defendants to enter a plea of guilty before being admitted to drug court.
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 216.05(4) (McKinney 2015). Therefore, the post-plea model, which
is most widely used in the United States, more acutely affects the disposition of the defendant’s
case in a criminal prosecution. HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 51, at 24 (“As of
December 31, 2009, the majority (58%) of Adult Drug Courts followed a post-plea model.”).
181 I.e., staffings, status hearings, and termination.
182 See Woods v. Donald, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (per curiam); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.
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On the other hand, in the post-sentencing model, 183 where a
defendant enters drug court after sentencing as a term of probation, the
drug court proceeding is not part of a “criminal prosecution.” 184
However, according to probation revocation standards, 185 due process
requires the assistance of counsel at stages beyond a “criminal
prosecution” if necessary to ensure fairness. 186 In the post-sentencing
model, although a defendant enjoys only conditional liberty, 187 he still
may be incarcerated, which is certainly an imposition on this
conditional liberty. 188 Without counsel present during all stages of the
drug court proceeding, the defendant may not be capable of speaking
for himself, and the same cumulative liberty interest concern as seen in
the deferred prosecution and post-plea models, is at play. 189 Therefore,
due process requires the presence of counsel at drug court proceedings,
in the post-sentencing model as well. 190
Whether or not any drug court proceeding is so critical as to
require the assistance of counsel is a question that has yet to be
addressed by the Supreme Court. However, in People v. Garcia, the
New York Court of Appeals attempted to provide guidance on what
constitutes a critical stage in drug court by drawing a distinction
between proceedings that are administrative in nature, and those that
affect a defendant’s substantive due process rights. 191 The Court held
685, 695–96 (2002) (“A trial would be presumptively unfair, we said, where the accused is denied
the presence of counsel at a ‘critical stage,’ a phrase we used . . . to denote a step of a criminal
proceeding, such as arraignment, that held significant consequences for the accused.”) (citations
omitted).
183 In the post-sentencing model, a defendant enters a guilty plea and is sentenced to
probation, but successful completion of drug treatment court is a condition of their probation.
Also known as a post-adjudication or term of probation model. See HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE,
supra note 51, at 24.
184 Again, the “criminal prosecution” lasts until sentencing. 3 CRIM. PROC. § 11.2(b) (Westlaw
4th ed.).
185 See discussion supra Section I.B.3 (discussing probation revocation standards).
186 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65 (1932).
187 Since drug court is a condition of his probation.
188 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (“[T]he liberty of a parolee, although
indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty . . . .”). Additionally, since
many states have since established a blanket right to counsel in probation and parole revocation
hearings, it is logical to assume this protection should extend to drug court termination hearings
as well. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 32.2 (West 2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-32 (2013);
KANS. STAT. ANN. § 22-3716(b) (2015).
189 This factor, whether a defendant was capable of speaking for himself, was a factor
considered in the traditional probation revocation context, as promulgated in Gagnon v. Scarpelli.
411 U.S. 778, 790–91 (1973); see also discussion supra Section II.A. (discussing the cumulative
effects of sanctions).
190 See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790 (“[T]here will remain certain cases in which fundamental
fairness—the touchstone of due process—will require that the State provide at its expense
counsel for indigent probationers or parolees.”).
191 People v. Garcia, 92 N.Y.2d 726 (N.Y. 1999). In this case, the defendant entered a guilty
plea and agreed to a sentence of four and one-half years to nine years of incarceration if he failed
to successfully complete a drug treatment program through TASC. Id. at 728. Treatment
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that defendant’s right to counsel was not violated because the
proceeding in question was not an accusatory proceeding and did not
involve any factual determinations, but was rather administrative in
nature. 192
However, this administrative distinction is too limited and does not
adequately consider the function of the right to counsel as protecting a
defendant’s liberty interests by according due process of the law. 193 The
argument that staffings and status hearings are merely “administrative”
in nature and therefore not accusatory is especially relevant for staffings
and status hearings where a defendant is praised for their good behavior
and there are no sanctions imposed. 194 There, since a defendant’s liberty
interests are not affected, 195 the staffing or status hearing may in fact
seem administrative in nature. However, merely requiring defense
counsel when a defendant’s liberty interests are most affected is
problematic given the cumulative effect of drug court proceedings on a
particular defendant’s case. 196
Considering the principles discussed above, Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence aptly supports the proposal calling for the requirement of
defense counsel at all stages of a drug court proceeding.

Alternatives for Safer Communities (TASC), originally known as “Treatment Alternatives to
Street Crime,” is an organization dedicated to diverting defendants with nonviolent charges to
community-based programs. See generally TASC, http://www2.tasc.org (last visited Nov. 21,
2015). Defendant was rejected from his TASC-approved treatment facility for violating certain
rules and was brought before the court to determine whether he should be placed in a different
program. Garcia, 92 N.Y.2d at 728. At a court appearance on February 20, 1997 after being
adjourned several times, the defendant was present in court without counsel yet the court
discharged TASC from the case and set a date for sentencing. Id. at 728–30. The matter was
adjourned several times in order to allow TASC time to find defendant an alternative program to
participate in. Id. at 728. Defense counsel was not present at any of these adjournment dates, the
last of which was the February 20th court appearance, that is the matter of contention here. Id.
192 Garcia, 92 N.Y.2d at 731 (“Significantly, it was not an accusatory proceeding affording
defendant an opportunity to explain charges against him or requiring the court to make factual or
legal determinations affecting his liberty. . . . The only issues addressed at the February 20
proceeding were administrative concerns that the court sought to have answered by the TASC
representative.”). The court reasoned that since there was no dispute as to defendant’s violation of
his drug treatment program, there were no factual or legal questions at issue. Id.
193 See Quinn, supra note 143, at 68 (“The Garcia decision reads too great a limit into the
concept of right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Indeed, as already discussed, there are
many stages of the criminal prosecution that are ‘critical’ even when a defendant is not called
upon to answer allegations.”).
194 See KEY COMPONENTS, supra note 28, at 23–24.
195 Meaning, they are not deprived of their life or liberty (i.e., jail time). See discussion supra
Section II.A.
196 The cumulative effect of sanctions is described in the hypothetical discussed supra Section
II.A.
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Zealous & Effective Advocacy in all Drug Court Proceedings:
How the Right to Counsel Applies

One of the defining characteristics of drug court is the attention to
each defendant’s case throughout the entirety of his participation in
drug court. 197 Without defense counsel present at all stages of a criminal
proceeding, however, this characteristic may potentially prejudice a
defendant. 198 Despite the non-adversarial nature of drug court and the
recommended teamwork approach, diversion to drug court has a serious
impact on the disposition of a defendant within the criminal justice
system. 199 Once it is held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
applies in a particular proceeding, there must then be effective
assistance of counsel. Zealous and effective advocacy is part and parcel
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 200
Competent representation within drug court begins with informing
a client of the advantages of drug court as well as the consequences of
participating, depending on which model is employed and where in the
criminal process the client is. 201 Once a defendant is diverted to drug
court, the next most important way counsel can zealously advocate for
their client is by simply showing up. 202 Despite the highly involved role
of the judge in drug court, 203 and the non-adversarial nature of the
diversion program in general, 204 defense counsel must not only be
present at all staffings and status hearings, but they must also zealously
and effectively advocate for the interests of their client. The non197
198

See discussion supra Section I.A. (discussing the drug court model generally).
If the judge is the only team member with any indication of what’s occurring on a regular
basis, how is the defense attorney supposed to come in when an incarceration sanction is ordered
and argue on behalf of his client if he is so out of the loop? Requiring counsel during all stages of
a drug court proceeding, not just during incarceration, is necessary given the cumulative effects of
all status hearings.
199 As discussed in Section III.A., a defendant’s disposition in the criminal justice system,
especially if in the deferred prosecution or post-plea drug court model, is dependent on their
completion, or lack thereof, of drug court.
200 See discussion supra Section I.B.4.
201 ORR ET AL., supra note 37, at 31. This also includes getting a sense of the defendant’s
history and genuinely attempting to figure out whether this defendant has the willpower and
tenacity to successfully complete a drug court diversion program. Id. at 31.
202 See discussion supra Section II.B. (discussing the lack of attendance on the part of many
drug court defense attorneys).
203 KEY COMPONENTS, supra note 28, at 27 (“A drug court judge must be prepared to
encourage appropriate behavior and to discourage and penalize inappropriate behavior. A drug
court judge is knowledgeable about treatment methods and their limitations.”). The supervisory
position of the judge is incredibly important to the process, since it demonstrates that someone in
authority actually cares about this defendant and the struggles they are facing. Id.
204 Id. at 11 (“Using a nonadversarial approach, prosecution and defense counsel promote
public safety while protecting participants’ due process rights.”). The prosecutor and defense
counsel must shed their traditional adversarial roles in order to work together as a team and
remain coordinated in the court’s response to noncompliance. Id. at 11.
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adversarial nature of drug court complicates this analysis, but effective
assistance of counsel must not be disregarded altogether. Defense
counsel in drug court must still protect the interests of their clients,
whose liberty depends on the effective representation by their
counsel. 205
However in the drug court context, effective representation does
not necessarily mean assisting a client in avoiding sanctions altogether,
or ignoring the treatment recommendations of the drug court staff. 206
Rather, defense counsel must actively participate in communications
with the drug court staff by explaining their client’s circumstances
which might be unknown to the prosecutor and judge. 207 Accordingly,
this requires defense counsel to be present during all stages of the drug
court proceeding so as to remain informed and prepared to advocate for
their clients’ interests in the event of a liberty depriving sanction. 208
CONCLUSION
Drug courts have proven to be an effective alternative to traditional
criminal proceedings for non-violent drug offenders and are
undoubtedly here to stay. 209 Precisely for these reasons, the
205 ORR ET AL., supra note 37, at 32 (“If the attorney fails to advocate on behalf of the client,
there is a risk that clients will grow to doubt the value of their own rights and will view the
process as a sham because no one is speaking on their behalf.”).
206 This tension is the crux of the problematic role of the defense attorney in drug court. See
Bolt, supra note 150, at 1264–65 (“The conundrum for defenders is how to mediate this clash of
perspectives: Should they proceed principally as members of the treatment team and seek to
persuade their clients that the court’s position has integrity, or should they adopt the point of view
of at least some defendants and seek to undermine the judge’s efforts by raising potentially
available points of law?”).
207 This opportunity most frequently presents itself during staffings. See ORR ET AL., supra
note 37, at 32 (“Counsel may know things the rest of the team does not know and must bring to
light that information in order to reduce a sanction or dissuade against termination.”).
208 A liberty depriving sanction could mean incarceration. Sanctions for noncompliance, as
detailed in Key Component #6, include: Warnings and admonishment from the bench in open
court, demotion to earlier program phases, increased frequency of testing and court appearances,
confinement in the courtroom or jury box, increased monitoring and/or treatment intensity, fines,
required community service or work programs, escalating periods of jail confinement, termination
from the program and reinstatement of regular court processing. KEY COMPONENTS, supra note
28, at 24–25.
209 Studies show that drug courts reduce recidivism significantly. According to The
Sentencing Project, graduates of drug court are less likely to be rearrested than persons processed
through traditional court mechanics. KING & PASQUARELLA, supra note 19, at 5 (“Findings from
drug court evaluations show that participation in drug courts results in fewer rearrests and
reconvictions, or longer periods between arrests.”); see also DRUG STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at
20 (stating that drug abuse is eliminated for the 50–65% of participants who graduate after a
year). Recidivism rates for drug courts were determined to be 8 to 26 percentage points lower
than traditional justice system responses. HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 51, at 9. Along
with decreased recidivism, several studies suggest that drug courts save money through both
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constitutional issues that arise due to the innovative court model they
employ cannot be disregarded or ignored. The cumulative liberty
interests at stake are not merely trivial. Virtually every aspect of a drug
court proceeding may affect the ultimate disposition of a defendant’s
criminal record and the amount of time he spends incarcerated. 210 All
stages of a drug court proceeding, including staffings, status hearings,
and termination hearings, are critical stages, and should be regarded as
such within the jurisprudence of the Sixth Amendment. 211 Despite the
non-adversarial nature of the drug court model, holding that counsel is
constitutionally required during all critical stages of a drug court
proceeding, will nonetheless imply zealous and effective advocacy on
the part of the defense attorneys, which is equally crucial to the
protection of participants’ liberty interests. 212

direct and indirect savings. See DRUG STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 20; KING & PASQUARELLA,
supra note 19, at 8.
210 Depending on what sanctions are imposed, if any. See discussion supra Section II.A.
211 See discussion supra Section III.A. (discussing the proposal for considering all stages of a
drug court proceeding as critical stages, thus requiring zealous and effective counsel).
212 However, considering the discussion supra Section II.B., defense attorneys will still be
able to protect their clients’ interests while remaining within the spirit of the treatment based drug
court model. Before adaptations to their traditional adversarial role can be thoroughly fleshed out,
there must be a recognition that the defense attorney’s place in the drug court proceeding is
crucial to protect the liberty interests of her client.

